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Abstract
In this paper, I explore some of the motivations behind John Martin Fischer’s 
semi-compatibilism. Particularly, I look at three reasons Fischer gives for pre-
ferring semi-compatibilism to libertarianism. I argue that the first two of these 
motivations are in tension with each other: the more one is moved by the first 
motivation, the less one can appeal to the second, and vice versa. I then argue that 
Fischer’s third motivation ought not move anyone to prefer Fischer’s semi-com-
patibilist picture to any of the leading contemporary libertarian theories. Finally, 
I make some methodological comments about the role intuitions play in Fischer’s 
project.
Keywords: John Martin Fischer, semi-compatibilism, motivation, free will, 
resilience, luck.
Resumen
En este artículo exploro algunas de las motivaciones detrás del semicompatibi-
lismo de John Martin Fischer. En particular, examino tres razones que Fischer 
ofrece para preferir el semicompatibilismo sobre el libertarismo. Defiendo que las 
dos primeras motivaciones se encuentran en tensión la una con la otra: cuanto 
más motivado se encuentre uno por la primera, menos lo estará por la segunda y 
viceversa. Después defiendo que la tercera motivación de Fischer no ha de inclinar 
a nadie a preferir su visión semicompatibilista sobre ninguna de las teorías liber-
taristas contemporáneas. Finalizo con unos comentarios metodológicos acerca del 
papel que las intuiciones juegan en el proyecto de Fischer. 
Palabras clave: John Martin Fischer, semicompatibilismo, motivación, 
libre albedrío, resistencia, suerte. 
1. Introduction
John Martin Fischer’s particular version of compatibilism is ex-
ceedingly influential in the contemporary literature on free will and 
moral responsibility.1 According to Fischer’s brand of compatibilism, 
which he calls ‘semi-compatibilism’, the truth of causal determinism 
* ktimpe@nnu.edu
1 A number of the works in which Fischer develops and defends semi-compatibilism 
are co-authored with Mark Ravizza. In what follows, I will focus primarily on some 
of Fischer’s more recent single-authored work.
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is compatible with moral responsibility even if causal determinism 
ends up being incompatible with a certain kind of freedom. Fischer 
differentiates between two kinds of control: guidance control and 
regulative control. Regulative control involves having control over 
which of a number of genuinely open possibilities becomes actual. 
And while semi-compatibilism is officially agnostic about whether 
regulative control is compatible with the truth of causal determin-
ism, Fischer himself finds it “highly plausible” (Fischer 2007 56) 
that regulative control is incompatible with causal determinism. 
(In particular, Fischer is inclined to accept the soundness of the 
Consequence Argument, which argues that if determinism is true, 
no one ever has the freedom to choose otherwise (ibid.).) But, for 
reasons related to Frankfurt scenarios, Fischer thinks that regula-
tive control is not required for moral responsibility. The freedom 
relevant condition necessary for moral responsibility is guidance 
control, and such control is compatible with determinism. 
Fischer’s discussion of guidance control is extensive and well-
known. Here, let me simply give a brief but hopefully sufficient 
overview for the task at hand. According to Fischer, “guidance con-
trol of one’s behaviors has two components: the behavior must issue 
from one’s own mechanism, and this mechanism must be appropri-
ately responsive to reasons” (Fischer 2002 307). The responsiveness 
that Fischer takes to be required here requires that the agent “act on 
a mechanism that is regularly receptive to reasons, some of which 
are moral reasons” (Fischer & Ravizza 82). This means that the vo-
litional structure that results in the agent’s choices manifests an 
understandable pattern of recognizing moral reasons for choosing 
in various ways. Such an agent “recognizes how reasons fit together, 
sees why one reason is stronger than another, and understands how 
the acceptance of one reason as sufficient implies that a stronger 
reason must also be sufficient” (id. 71). Furthermore, the agent’s vo-
litional structure must also be reactive to those reasons in the right 
kind of way:
In the case of reactivity to reasons, the agent (when acting from 
the relevant mechanism) must simply display some reactivity, in order 
to render it plausible that his mechanism has the ‘executive power’ to 
react to the actual incentive to do otherwise. (Fisher & Ravizza 75) 
The second requirement for guidance control is that the agent 
takes responsibility for the reasons-responsive mechanism that re-
sults in her choices; that is, that the mechanism is her own, or one 
for which she has taken responsibility. This feature of Fischer’s 
view marks an important difference from purely structural or hi-
erarchical compatibilist accounts (such as Harry Frankfurt’s). For 
Fischer, “the mere existence of [the right kind of volitional] mesh is 
not sufficient for moral responsibility; the history behind the mesh 
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is also relevant” (Fisher & Ravizza 196). So, in order for an agent to 
be morally responsible, he needs to have taken responsibility for his 
volitional structure. 
Taking responsibility involves three elements. First, the agent 
must see that his choices have certain effects in the world —that is, he 
must see himself as the source of consequences in the world (in certain 
circumstances). Second, the individual must see that he is a fair target 
for the reactive attitudes as a result of how he affects the world. Third, 
the views specified in the first two conditions —that the individual 
can affect the external world in certain characteristic ways through 
his choices, and the he can be fairly praised and/or blamed for so ex-
ercising his agency— must be based on his evidence in an appropriate 
way. (Fischer 2006b 224)
There is much in Fischer’s semi-compatibilism to admire, and 
it is not surprising that it has been called both “the most plausible 
compatibilist account of freedom” (Rowe 298) and “the best case for 
compatibilism to date” (McKenna 132).
In this paper, I explore some of the motivations behind semi-
compatibilism. In particular, I look at three reasons Fischer gives 
for preferring semi-compatibilism to libertarianism. I argue that the 
first two of these motivations are in tension with one another: the 
more one is moved by the first motivation, the less one can appeal to 
the second, and vice versa. I then argue that Fischer’s third motiva-
tion ought not move anyone to prefer Fischer’s semi-compatibilist 
picture to any of the leading contemporary libertarian theories.2 
Finally, I end with some methodological comments about the role 
intuitions play in Fischer’s project.
2. The Resilience of Semi-compatibilism
The first motivation behind semi-compatibilism I want to explore 
is what Dan Speak has labeled “the resiliency intuition” (Speak 124).3 
According to this intuition, “our self-conception as morally responsi-
ble agents should be understood to possess a certain kind of stability. 
It should not be too easily undermined or too readily threatened by at 
least certain possible ways the world could turn out to be. It should, 
2 As Fabio Fang has pointed out in correspondence, there is a sense in which the third 
motivation for semi-compatibilism can be seen as a specific instance of the second. 
“Luck has been defined by you as the lack of certain type of control. Now, total control 
(which we lack), is the lack of certain type of control. [So] what is different in the third 
reason (or motivation) that is not present in the second?” In a sense, Fang is right. 
But insofar as Fischer addresses ‘total control’ in a different context than he does the 
problem of luck, I think it’s worth treating this as a separate motivation even if it is 
not entirely separate.
3 For an incompatibilist defense of the resiliency intuition, see Helen Steward (2008).
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in short, be resilient” (ibid). Here is one of Fischer’s presentations of 
the resilience motivation:
I could certainly imagine waking up some morning to the news-
paper headline, “Causal Determinism Is True!” (Most likely this would 
not be in the National Enquirer or even People —but perhaps the New 
York Times…) I could imagine reading the article and subsequent-
ly (presumably over some time) becoming convinced that causal 
determinism is true —that the generalizations that describe the re-
lationships between complexes of past events and laws of nature, on 
the one hand, and subsequent events, on the other, are universal gen-
eralizations with 100 percent probabilities associated with them. And 
I feel confident that this would not, nor should it, change my view of 
myself and others as (sometimes) free and robustly morally respon-
sible agents […]. The assumption that we human beings —most of us, 
at least— are morally responsible agents (at least sometimes) is ex-
tremely important and pervasive. In fact, it is hard to imagine human 
life without it […]. A compatibilist need not give up this assumption 
[that we are at least sometimes free and morally responsible], even if 
he were to wake up to the headline, “Causal Determinism is True!” 
(and if he were convinced of its truth)[…]. A compatibilist need not 
‘flipflop’ in this weird and unappealing way. (Fischer 2007 44-47)
In contrast, if the libertarian were to become convinced that 
determinism were true, she would have to give up at least one of 
her beliefs under threat of inconsistency. That is, she would either 
have to abandon her belief that we are morally responsible beings, or 
she would have to abandon her incompatibilism. Peter van Inwagen 
suggests that he would make the latter move if he were convinced of 
the truth of determinism:
There is one question I shall very likely be asked by philosophers 
who think I have overstepped the bounds of philosophy. I think it is a 
very good question which I am bound to answer. That question might 
be put like this:
Very well. You admit that your theory [i. e., libertarianism] is in 
principle empirically refutable. If physics were to become once more 
deterministic, or if the empirical sciences of man were to provide us 
with really good reason for believing that a human being is a deter-
ministic system, then (you concede) your rejection of determinism 
would be rendered untenable by science. Well, suppose this did hap-
pen despite your prediction that it won’t. What would you say then?
I am not quite sure what I would say, but I believe I would say that 
(β)4 [which figures centrally in the argument for incompatibilism] was, 
4 β is the following inference rule: “p, and no one has, or ever had, any choice about 
that. If p then q, and no one has, or ever had, any choice about that. Hence, q, and no 
one has, or ever had, any choice about that” (van Inwagen 2004 223). In this article, 
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after all, invalid […] I have defended (β) entirely on a priori grounds. 
But it would not surprise me too much to find that this proposition, 
which at present seems to me to be a truth of reason, had been re-
futed by the progress of science. Such refutations have happened many 
times. And it does not follow from the fact that they have happened 
that there is anything wrong with accepting on a priori grounds a 
principle that later turns out to be empirically refutable. One must 
simply realize that a priori convictions are as corrigible as any others. 
(van Inwagen 1983 219, 221)5 
As van Inwagen here admits, given the possibility of the 
empirical discovery of the truth of determinism, libertarian be-
liefs are not as resilient as their compatibilist cohorts. And this 
resilience is one of the driving motivations behind Fischer’s semi-
compatibilism: 
One of my main motivations for being a compatibilist is that I 
don’t want our personhood and our moral responsibility, as it were, to 
hang on a thread, or to be held hostage to the possible scientific dis-
covery that determinism is in fact true” (Fischer 2000 323).6 
All else being equal, it does seem preferable to have our beliefs 
—especially such a central belief as that we are morally responsible 
agents— be resilient in this way.
3. Less Luck
So, according to Fischer, one reason to prefer semi-compat-
ibilism to libertarianism is its resilience. A second motivation 
is that, on the semi-compatibilist picture, moral responsibility 
does not depend on things which it shouldn’t; more specifically, 
an agent’s responsibility only depends on those things which the 
agent can reasonably be said to control. To make this point in a 
negative way, an agent’s responsibility cannot simply be a matter 
of luck.
van Inwagen goes on to describe how while β is technically invalid, he is “inclined to 
think that the ‘general idea’ behind Rule β was sound, and that its invalidity stemmed 
from the fact that certain features of the English phrase unfit it for the task he as-
signed it” (id. 224).
5 Derk Pereboom is an incompatibilism who later came to reject his belief in free will 
and moral responsibility —though not because he thinks that determinism is true. 
Rather, he thinks that whatever indeterminism there may be in the world is not the 
kind needed to underwrite moral responsibility.
6 See also Fischer (1999 129) and Fischer (2006b 183). For another presentation of this 
concern, see Manuel Vargas (2007 141f). Fischer grants that there are other empirical 
discoveries that would threaten our view of ourselves as free and responsible agents; 
see, for instance, Fischer (2008a 169).
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Now, it is no easy task to define just what luck is.7 A natural way 
of thinking about the nature of luck is to say that an event (or fact) is 
lucky for an individual if she had no control over the occurring (or 
obtaining) of that event (or fact). This idea is at the heart of the Luck 
Objection to libertarianism. Here is one formulation of that objec-
tion which makes clear the contrast between luck and control:
Agents’ control is the yardstick by which the bearing of chance or 
luck on their autonomy and moral responsibility is measured. Luck 
(good or bad) becomes problematic when it seems significantly to im-
pede agents’ control over themselves […]. To the extent that it is causally 
undetermined whether, for example, an agent intends or decides in ac-
cordance with a better judgment that she made, the agent may seem to 
lack control over what she intends or decides. (Mele 2002 535)
As this quotation from Mele suggests, luck (in the relevant sense) 
can be understood as a kind of lack of control. But trying to define 
precisely what kind of control is required in the present context is 
likely to be just as difficult as defining luck. It cannot be, for ex-
ample, that agents must have control over all those factors which are 
logically necessary for our moral responsibility. This kind of control 
is what Fischer calls ‘total control’: “an agent has total control over X 
only if for any factor f which is a causal contributor to X and which 
is such that if f were not to occur, then X would (or might) not occur, 
then X has control over f ” (Fischer 2007 67, see also Fischer 2006a 
125). But there are innumerable factors, that are causal contributors 
to an agent’s moral agency, over which the agent has no control, let 
alone total control:
The sun is shining (through the smog), and its continuing to shine 
is a contributing causal factor to my continuing to exist, continuing 
to be an agent, and so forth. If the sun were to flicker out, I would not 
continue to exist, continue to be an agent, or engage in any behavior. 
So the sun’s continuing to shine is a contributing cause to my behav-
ior, is completely out of my control, and is such that, if it were not to 
occur, I would not even exist […]. Obviously, the sun’s continuing to 
shine is just one of an indefinitely large number of such factors: a huge 
meteorite’s not hitting the United States, my not being hit by a light-
ning bold, and so forth […]. Consider now the fact that my parents did 
not seriously injure me when I was young and helpless […]. That they 
took good care of me was a contributing cause of my developing into 
an agent at all. Had they significantly abused and injured me, I would 
or at least might not have developed into an agent at all.And of course 
how my parents treated me when I was an infant was entirely out of 
my control. (Fischer 2007 67f)
7 For two helpful discussions about the metaphysical nature of luck, see Jennifer Lackey 
(2008) and E. J. Coffman (2007). 
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As these comments make clear, it is necessarily true that no 
contingent agent has total control. (I say more on total control in 
section 5 below). As a result, luck understood as lack of total control 
is necessarily everywhere —and thus infects both incompatibilist 
and compatibilist views alike.
So in order to function as motivation for the semi-compatibilist 
project, the lack of control involved in the Luck Objection must 
mean something other than lack of total control. Compatibilists like 
Fischer argue that, on the libertarian picture, agents lack the relevant 
control precisely where it matters for moral responsibility —in the 
choices that lead to their (presumably responsible) behavior. Given 
that the agent’s values, beliefs, and motivational states are compos-
sible with her making multiple choices:
In a context of indeterminism, we do not have an explanation for 
why the agent made the particular choice he made rather than another. 
The [Luck Objection]8 points to the fact that the antecedent conditions 
—say my standing desires, values, intentions, and plans— cannot in 
themselves explain why I actually choose C rather than something else 
(given indeterminism) […] Given this, it can seem that I do not actu-
ally control my behavior in the sense relevant to ascriptions of moral 
responsibility. (Fischer 1999 102, see also Fischer 2006a 127 f)
According to Fischer, the presence of this kind of luck in the 
causal origin of a volition is “menacing” (Fischer 2008b 197) and 
a “major challenge to libertarianism” (Fischer 1999 102, see also 
Fischer 2008b 196).
4. The Tension
I do not deny the motivational force of these features of semi-
compatibilism (or of  other versions of compatibilism more broadly); 
nor is it my intent to argue against the truth of semi-compatibilism 
here. Rather, what I want to do is to suggest that there is a tension 
between these two motivations in the following sense: the more 
motivational strength the compatibilist assigns to one of these two 
reasons for compatibilism, the less motivational strength she can as-
sign to the other.9 Imagine a linear spectrum in motivational space. 
(Such a picture is an oversimplification, as there very well may be 
further motivations for semi-compatibilism, which would make the 
spectrum a multi-dimensional matrix. I am setting aside these other 
motivations for present purposes.) Those at one end of the spec-
trum are motivated solely by the resilience intuition; those at this 
pole have as their goal making moral responsibility as impervious 
to scientific discoveries as possible. In order to have the existence of 
8 He calls it the ‘rollback argument’. See Fischer (1999 102).
9 For a related discussion see Mele (2006 205f).
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moral responsibility be consistent with as much empirical, scientific 
discovery as possible, the resilience intuition would lead one to 
develop one’s account of responsibility in such a way that it is com-
patible with both determinism and with indeterminism —and, in 
fact, compatible with as many different kinds of indeterminism as 
possible, given the other constraints one’s theory already contains. 
As a result of holding that such a range of indeterminism would not 
undermine moral responsibility, considerations of luck will have less 
motivational pull. To put it a different way, if one thinks that free 
will is compatible with both determinism and indeterminism at a 
wide range of places causally relevant to a particular action, the less 
dialectical force the Luck Objection will carry —for if indetermin-
ism per se doesn’t undermine free will, then the driving intuition 
behind the Luck Objection will be undercut.
On the other hand, the closer one is to the other pole of the mo-
tivational spectrum —the more one is motivated by worries about 
luck— the less one’s view of ourselves as responsible agents will be 
resilient to scientific discovery. That is, the greater the worries about 
luck undermining control motivate compatibilism, the more one’s 
view is ‘held hostage to science’ insofar as the discovery of indeter-
minism in various spots in the causal history of an action or choice 
would undermine the agent’s responsibility for that action or choice. 
The extreme on this side of the spectrum is illustrated by the title 
of a paper from the 1930s by R. E. Hobart: “Free Will as Involving 
Determinism and Inconceivable Without It.” Hobart’s title suggests 
that any amount of indeterminism, at least as related to choice and 
action, is detrimental to moral agency. Hobart writes: 
[S]uch absence of determination, if and so far as it exists, is no 
gain to freedom, but sheer loss of it; no advantage to the moral life, 
but blank subtraction from it […]. Freedom is something that we 
can attribute only to a continuing being, and he can have it only so 
far as the particular transient volitions within him are determined. 
(Hobart 2 and 13)
To be fair to Hobart, it is doubtful that he intended his title to be 
taken as literally true.10 He is willing to grant, for instance, that the 
presence of indeterminism wouldn’t necessarily undermine freedom 
and responsibility if that indeterminism were causally irrelevant to 
the action (or volition) in question (see, for instance, Hobart 17). 
10 A recent interdisciplinary collection on free will does contain an essay defending 
this literal Hobartian position: “So we do have free will in a deterministic universe. 
Indeterminism, on the other hand, makes free will impossible […]. To the extent that 
determinism is true, we humans do indeed have something that we all innately feel 
and believe that we have: free will. In this most important sense, determinism makes 
free will possible” (Baer 309). 
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Furthermore, he also suggests that he would not have been willing 
to give up his belief in free will even were he to be convinced of the 
falsity of causal determinism: “That we are free in willing is, broadly 
speaking, a fact of experience. That broad fact is more assured than 
any philosophical analysis. It is therefore surer than the determin-
istic analysis of it, entirely adequate as that in the end appears to 
be” (id. 2). But it should nevertheless be obvious that Hobart’s view, 
based as it is on “a deterministic basis and constitution” (id. 1) of free 
will, is not as resilient as those compatibilist views which are neutral 
with respect to the compatibility of free will and indeterminism. The 
more one affirms the adage that luck undermines control the less 
resilient the resulting theory of moral responsibility to potential sci-
entific falsification.11
Returning then to Fischer’s influential semi-compatibilism. 
Fischer is clearly no Hobartian,12 for the former’s account differs 
significantly from the latter’s with respect to the resilience intuition. 
Given the tension noted between the concern for resiliency and 
worries about luck, semi-compatibilism can make less of the luck 
objection. And this is precisely what one finds in Fischer’s corpus. 
While he does raise the possibility that the indeterminism required 
by libertarian accounts could undermine rather than support agen-
tial control, he presses this objection less forcefully than other 
compatibilists (e. g., Haji). Fischer here, as he does elsewhere, strikes 
a fine balance. And while this tension doesn’t show that semi-com-
patibilism, or any version of compatibilism for that matter, is false, 
it does show a dialectical delicacy that I think has previously gone 
underappreciated by many compatibilists. At the end of the day, it 
looks like these two compatibilist ‘lures’ are pulling in opposite 
directions.13 
5. Total Control and Metaphysical Megalomania
In the discussion of luck in section 3 above, we encountered a 
notion of control that Fischer calls ‘total control’. Largely because 
of issues related to Frankfurt-style examples and the apparently 
11 This implication is noted by Manuel Vargas. “Consider that many compatibilists argue 
against libertarianism on the grounds that indeterminism disrupts responsibility. For 
these compatibilists, if it turned out that the world had indeterminacies of just the right 
sort (or perhaps more accurately the ‘wrong sort’), then we would lack responsibility un-
der even compatibilist understandings of responsibility” (Vargas 2005 426 note 16).
12 Fischer acknowledges that on his view “the falsity of causal determinism in itself 
would not rule out control and moral responsibility” (1999 130).
13 Fischer could avoid this tension altogether by abandoning one or other of these 
motivations, so the argument above in no way counts as a refutation of semi-compat-
ibilism. Nevertheless, both motivations play a significant role in various compatibilist 
accounts that the tension is worth pointing out. See also footnote 19 below.
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soundness of the Consequence Argument14, Fischer’s semi-compat-
ibilism rejects the requirement than an agent be able to do otherwise 
than perform a particular in order to be morally responsible for that 
action. Instead, his account of the kind of control required for moral 
responsibility (what he calls ‘guidance control’) is based upon an 
agent’s having an appropriately reasons-responsive mechanism and 
having taken responsibility for that mechanism.15 Taken together, 
these two aspects clearly mark semi-compatibilism as a sourcehood 
approach —or as Fischer often puts it, an “actual-sequence” ap-
proach to free will and moral responsibility.16
Fischer brings up total control in his discussion of the sourcehood 
requirement for moral responsibility, and why one ought to prefer 
a compatibilist approach to sourcehood over an incompatibilist 
approach: 
I wish to explore some of the reasons why philosophers have con-
tended that causal determinism rules out sourcehood in the sense 
required by moral responsibility, and I wish to offer some plausibility-
arguments against this contention […] I do not suppose that I have 
exhausted the possible motivations for an incompatibilistic source-
hood requirement, or that I will have offered knockdown arguments 
against such a requirement. My goal is to lay down some of the salient 
motivations for the worry that causal determinism would threaten 
sourcehood, and to suggest that the worry may issue from a mistaken 
picture —an inflated conception of the sort of control we must possess 
in order to be morally responsible. (Fischer 2007 67)17
 
According to Fischer, “it is as if the proponent of the incom-
patibilistic sourcehood constraint thinks of agents who are morally 
responsible as having ‘total control’” (2007 67). Such control is “a total 
fantasy —metaphysical megalomania, if anything is” (ibid.). “A chi-
mera. It is manifestly ludicrous to aspire to it or to regret its absence” 
(id. 68). As such, wanting it is “unreasonable” (Fischer 2006a 117). 
I agree with Fischer that one ought to reject total control as a 
condition for moral responsibility; where I depart from Fischer, how-
ever, is in thinking that doing so gives any reason, in and of itself, to 
favor semi-compatibilism (or some other version of source compati-
bilism) over source incompatibilism. So far as I can tell, no source 
incompatibilist is motivated by total control. Anything resembling 
total control is conspicuously absent from the work of Robert Kane, 
14 See, for instance, Fischer (2007 56). For a very useful discussion of these issues, see 
Moya (2006 chap. 1).
15 See, for instance, Fischer & Ravizza (1998) and Fischer (2006b).
16 See, for instance, Fischer (2006b chap. 3, 12).
17 For a further discussion of Fischer’s treatment of sourcehood, see chapter 5 of Timpe 
(2008).
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Derk Pereboom, Timothy O’Connor, etc…18 One might think that an 
exception to this claim is the impossibilist (and hence, incompatibilist) 
Galen Strawson. According to Strawson, true moral responsibility re-
quires that the agent act with “true self-determination” (Strawson 7) 
and is “causa sui” (id. 15). But it is unclear if even Strawson’s Basic 
Argument requires total control, for Strawson nowhere suggests that 
one must have control over every factor which causally contributes 
in any way to her agency in order to be a true self-determiner. 
Fischer uses the obvious problems with total control to provide 
a further motivation for preferring semi-compatibilism (or perhaps 
some other form of compatibilism) to libertarianism, despite the fact 
that he’s aware that no source incompatibilist appeals to total con-
trol to motivate her position:
Now of course one might seek to motivate an incompatibilist 
source requirement in various different ways. But my suggestion is 
that, once one sees that the picture that favors total control is inflated 
and illusory, one might have considerably less inclination to accept 
such a requirement for any reason […] My suggestion (and it is merely 
a suggestion) is that, once one recognizes the pervasiveness of a cer-
tain sort of luck, one will find an incompatibilistic source condition 
less attractive. (Fischer 2007 68f)
 
In the absence of any explicit mention of total control on behalf 
of source incompatibilists, and without an argument which links 
source incompatibilism and total control, it is hard to see why the 
rejection of the latter gives us reason to reject the former. There very 
well may be other reasons to prefer compatibilist accounts of source-
hood over incompatibilist accounts, but the rejection of total control 
isn’t among them.
6. A Push Towards More Substantial Revision
In the previous sections, I’ve canvassed three of the recent 
motivations John Fischer presents in favor of preferring semi-com-
patibilism to versions of source incompatibilism. With respect to 
worries regarding total control, I argued that we have no reason to 
think that worries about our failing to have total control should lead 
us to prefer semi-compatibilism over source incompatibilism. So 
far as I can tell, no extant theory of responsibility is motivated by 
such an account of control, and any view which was would have, as 
Fischer argues, a significant strike against it. Regarding the first two 
motivations Fischer raises, I argued that they are in tension with 
each other; while this tension doesn’t show that semi-compatibilism 
18  See, for instance, Robert Kane (1996), Derk Pereboom (2001), and Timothy O’Connor 
(2005). For my own arguments for source incompatibilism, see Timpe (2008), par-
ticularly chapters 5-6.
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(or any version of compatibilism for that matter) is false, it does 
show a dialectical delicacy that I think has previously gone under-
appreciated by many compatibilists.19 Furthermore, I think that this 
tension raises a related methodological issue that Fischer, as well as 
a number of like-minded compatibilists, must address. Of course, 
nothing that I’ve argued here shows that semi-compatibilism is false 
or unmotivated, for there well might be reasons that favor semi-
compatibilism over competing views. And regardless of the truth of 
semi-compatibilism, Fischer’s development and defense of this posi-
tion has greatly contributed to current debates about free will and 
moral responsibility.
In the remainder of this article, I want to consider a methodological 
point related to Fischer’s attempt to navigate between conflicting 
intuitions, such as the resilience intuition and the worry that luck 
undermines free will. The present point, however, is not limited to 
these two intuitions, but is related to the more general relationship 
between Fischer’s semi-compatibilist view and intuitive support on 
the whole. 
Reacting to comments by Manuel Vargas, Fischer grants that 
“semicompatibilism is a significant revision of ordinary, com-
monsense thinking —as well as standard philosophical reflection 
on freedom and moral responsibility” (Fischer 2007b 188). Shortly 
thereafter, he elaborates as follows:
To be a bit more explicit. I distinguish between the concept of 
moral responsibility and the conditions of its application. With re-
gard to the concept, I do not consider myself a revisionist; I attempt to 
understand a robust ordinary notion of moral responsibility. But my 
account of the conditions of its application are significantly revision-
ary (perhaps even revolutionary), insofar as I think it can apply even 
in contexts in which an agent has never had genuine access to meta-
physical alternative possibilities. (2007b 188)
Before addressing the import of this quotation, let me make an 
explicative comment first. While Fischer is directly addressing mor-
al responsibility in the quotation; as we saw earlier, he thinks there is 
a kind of free will (i. e., guidance control) that is required for moral 
responsibility. Thus, I think we can plausibly interpret him as also 
saying that he does not consider himself a revisionist about the kind 
of freedom required for moral responsibility without distortion. 
Commenting on Fischer’s revisionist tendencies, Manuel Vargas ar-
gues that Fischer’s view is a form of what Vargas calls weak revisionism. 
19 Commenting on a previous version of this paper, Carlos Patarroyo suggested that the 
objections I raise to Fischer’s semicompatibilism here may apply to all compatibilism 
in general. If this is indeed the case, then I take that to be a further reason why it is 
important to note the objections raised here.
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The difference between weak revisionism, like Fischer’s, and Vargas’s 
own preferred moderate revisionism, is as follows:
Weak revisionism is revisionism about what the folk think they 
think: it is the idea that the folk have in some way failed to appreci-
ate the nature of their own conceptual or metaphysical commitments. 
While the folk really believe X, the folk mistakenly understand them-
selves to believe Y. In contrast, moderate revisionism is revisionism 
about what the folk think. (Vargas 2007b 217)
Insofar as Fischer writes, as seen above, that he does not consider 
himself a revisionist about the concept of moral responsibility, 
Vargas’s claim that Fischer isn’t a moderate revisionist is correct. 
But this is where Fischer’s attempt to respect our pre-philosophical 
intuitions becomes potentially problematic. As mentioned earlier, 
Fischer is willing to grant the soundness of the Consequence 
Argument, which he thinks “employs highly plausible ingredients” 
(Fischer 2007 71).20 He elaborates as follows:
It is natural to think of oneself as possessing regulative control, 
and that it is plausible to analyze this in terms of the power to add 
to the actual past (the entirety of the temporally nonrelational past), 
holding fixed the laws of nature. A semi-compatibilist need not dismiss 
out of hand, or profess puzzlement, about what is surely an intuitive 
natural set of views.
Such terminology strongly suggests that if he doesn’t find the 
Consequence Argument to be specifically intuitive, it’s something 
in the neighborhood. So, as with the resilience intuition and the 
intuition that free will cannot depend upon luck, a key feature 
that differentiates Fischer’s semi-compatibilism from other ex-
tant compatibilist accounts is that he can respect the intuitiveness 
(or something near to it) of the Consequence Argument. 
It is here that Fischer’s attempt to ‘save the intuitions’ becomes 
problematic, particularly in light in his preference to avoid revising 
the concept of moral responsibility rather than the conditions of its 
application. For according to the Consequence Argument, there is a 
kind of freedom that the truth of determinism would rule out; but 
this kind of freedom is supposed to be the kind of freedom required 
for moral responsibility.21 If this is correct, then there is a significant 
part of the concept of moral responsibility that cannot be had on the 
20 However, for the record “semicompatibilism in itself does not take a stand on whether 
the Consequence Argument is sound; it is consistent with acceptance or rejection of 
the Consequence Argument” (Fischer 207 56). 
21 So says van Inwagen: “the existence of moral responsibility entails the existence of 
free will, and, therefore, if free will does not exist, moral responsibility does not exist 
either” (forthcoming). 
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truth of determinism if one grants, as Fischer does, the soundness of 
the Consequence Argument. Related to what Fischer says about the 
plausibility of the Consequence Argument is the intuitive pull that 
the Principle of Alternative Possibilities has:22
Because the Principle of Alternative Possibilities expresses such 
a plausible and attractive idea, and because we typically think of our-
selves as selecting a path into the future (where there is more than one 
such path available), semi-compatibilism is a significant revision of 
ordinary, commonsense thinking —as well as standard philosophi-
cal reflection on freedom and moral responsibility. I do not deny that 
alternative possibilities are a presupposition of commonsense as well 
as philosophical analysis; rather, I seek to explain how we can offer a 
subtler, more refined analysis which dispenses with the requirement 
of metaphysical access to alternative possibilities, but also preserved 
and explains the connection between freedom (of an appropriate sort 
—guidance control) and moral responsibility. (Fischer 2007b 188)
Here, Fischer seems more willing to grant that semi-compat-
ibilism may involve ‘a significant revision of ordinary thinking’ 
about the concept of what moral responsibility requires. While the 
above comments about the Consequence Argument perhaps indi-
rectly support viewing semi-compatibilism as a form of moderate 
revisionism, these comments on pap provide more direct support 
that semi-compatibilism is, or should be, more a form of moderate 
revisionism than a form of weak revisionism. That is, perhaps on the 
worked out semi-compatibilist picture moral responsibility was not 
what we initially thought it was.
Fischer could resist this push towards moderate revisionism 
by changing what he says about the intuitive plausibility of the 
Consequence Argument and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. 
Yet it seems more consistent with his overall semi-compatibilism, 
in particular the role played by the various intuitions that motivate 
the various parts of the project, perhaps to embrace moderate revi-
sionism instead. But regardless of the amount of revision involved, 
Fischer’s semi-compatibilism will certainly continue to be an influ-
ential account in debates about free will and moral responsibility. 23
22 While the Consequence Argument doesn’t explicitly involve the Principle of 
Alternative Possibilities, as Robert Kane argues the two are connected; see Kane 
(2005 23f). 
23 A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2008 Pacific Society of Christian 
Philosophers conference at the University of California at Riverside, where I benefited 
from numerous helpful comments and criticisms. In particular, I would like to thank 
John Fischer for his constructive comments and gentle guidance, both at this confer-
ence and throughout all of his work. Many thanks also to Carlos Patarroyo for helpful 
comments and for the invitation to contribute to this issue of the journal. I would also 
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